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Cogent justifi cations for con-tinuing subsidies to U.S. crop farmers are diffi cult to 
fi nd. Most analyses suggest that 
our farm programs lead to greater 
concentration, higher land prices 
and cash rents, increased produc-
tion of supported commodities, and 
lower market prices. And as we have 
pointed out in recent Iowa Ag Review 
articles, current subsidy programs 
provide a quite ineffi cient safety net: 
overcompensating producers in low 
price–high production years and 
undercompensating them in high 
price–low production years. In addi-
tion, farm subsidies go predominant-
ly to farm families that have higher 
wealth and income levels than the 
average U.S. family. And fi nally, there 
would be no major changes in aggre-
gate food production or food prices 
in the United States if subsidies were 
ended tomorrow.
Most supporters of farm sub-
sidies no longer attempt to justify 
them by appealing to any broad pub-
lic purpose. Rather, many now argue 
that it would be unfair to eliminate 
them. It would be unfair to those 
farmers who are counting on contin-
ued high land prices and cash rents 
for their retirement. It would be un-
fair to farmers who paid high prices 
for land in the expectation that sub-
sidies would continue to prop them 
up. It would be unfair to regions 
where production would decline 
dramatically if the subsidies were 
withdrawn. And fi nally, it would be 
unfair to U.S. farmers to have their 
subsidies taken away when farmers 
in other countries continue to enjoy 
production subsidies and protec-
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tion from international competition 
through high import tariffs.
An “unfair” playing fi eld in in-
ternational competition is now the 
most common justifi cation given for 
U.S. subsidies. A recent international 
example of an unfair trading practice 
is Argentina’s decision to tax wheat 
exports but not fl our exports. Not 
surprisingly, fl our exports increased 
signifi cantly. Millers in Chile suddenly 
found themselves at a competitive 
disadvantage because of this discrimi-
natory export tax. To level the playing 
fi eld, the Chilean government placed 
a countervailing duty on Argentina’s 
fl our exports. U.S. producer groups 
are quick to point out unfair trading 
practices. For example, the Ameri-
can Sugar Alliance argues that sugar 
import quotas are justifi able because 
otherwise U.S. consumers would be 
able to pay artifi cially low prices for 
their sugar. North Dakota wheat grow-
ers argue that they need subsidies to 
partially offset the damage they suffer 
from unfair Canadian wheat exports. 
And almost all agricultural groups 
argue that it would be foolish to “uni-
laterally disarm” until other countries 
agree to cut their subsidies. Given 
that the European Union has been 
the most egregious provider of do-
mestic subsidies, this last argument 
really amounts to: “let’s not cut ours 
until the E.U. cuts theirs.”
Who Faces Unfair Competition?
A recent study by my FAPRI col-
leagues at CARD and the University 
of Missouri helps provide insight into 
when the argument of unfair competi-
tion holds water. (See the article by 
John Beghin in this issue for details.) 
The study estimated what would 
happen to U.S. and world agriculture 
(grain and oilseeds, livestock, sugar, 
and cotton) if the recent U.S. WTO 
proposal were fully implemented. 
The United States proposed signifi -
cant cuts in both domestic subsi-
dies and tariffs for most products. 
Commodity prices under the U.S. 
proposal would be higher than the 
status quo because the decrease in 
production from protected farmers is 
greater than the production increase 
from competitive farmers. 
Regarding the fortunes of U.S. 
farmers under the proposal, we 
can measure the extent of damage 
from unfair competition by looking 
at the effects of the U.S. proposal 
on production and net exports 
(exports minus imports). Farmers 
who would respond to liberalization 
with increases in production and 
net exports are the farmers who are 
currently most damaged by for-
eign protectionism. Those farmers 
who would experience declines in 
production and net exports are the 
ones who are not justifi ed in argu-
ing for compensation because of un-
fair competition. This second set of 
farmers could be considered as pro-
viding unfair competition to foreign 
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producers. A third set of farmers are 
those producers who would pro-
duce just about the same amount 
under liberalization as they produce 
now. For this group the impetus to 
produce more from liberalization is 
about equal to existing production 
incentives of farm programs. This 
last group may be justifi ed in arguing 
for giving up their subsidies when 
others give up theirs.
The results of the FAPRI study 
indicate that U.S. livestock produc-
ers belong to the fi rst group of pro-
ducers. U.S. beef and pork exports 
would increase by about 25 per-
cent under the U.S. proposal, while 
broiler exports would increase by 
about 8 percent. Cattle and hog 
prices would increase by between 
4 and 5 percent while broiler prices 
would increase by approximately 2 
percent. The livestock results indi-
cate that E.U. production subsidies 
and high tariffs on meat imports 
around the world currently harm 
U.S. livestock producers. California 
rice producers also belong to this 
fi rst group because they would fi nd 
expanded demand for their product 
in Japan and South Korea. 
Milk producers and most grain 
and oilseed producers belong to the 
third set of producers who would 
fi nd that their production levels and 
net exports would largely be un-
changed under the U.S. proposal. For 
dairy, currently high E.U. support 
prices create surplus dairy products 
that have to be exported with subsi-
dies. Elimination of these surplus ex-
ports would signifi cantly raise world 
prices. This price increase would 
just about compensate U.S. dairy 
producers for cuts in the U.S. dairy 
program. For grains and oilseeds 
increased liberalization under the 
U.S. proposal has a small impact on 
demand. Thus U.S. dairy, grain, and 
oilseed producers could legitimately 
argue that they would be willing to 
give up their subsidies if the E.U. and 
other countries gave up theirs. 
Cotton and sugar producers 
belong to the second group of pro-
ducers because under the U.S. WTO 
proposal, production and net ex-
ports would decline. One can con-
clude from this study that for cotton 
and sugar, U.S. farm programs create 
an unfair playing fi eld for the rest of 
the world. For sugar, the situation is 
complicated because the net effect of 
trade barriers and subsidies around 
the world is a depression in world 
prices, which would seem to provide 
an argument in favor of continued 
U.S. support. However, it is clear that 
a move to lower production subsi-
dies and trade barriers would result 
in a sharp increase in U.S. sugar im-
ports and signifi cantly lower prices 
for U.S. sugar buyers.
Not All Our Competitors 
Are Subsidized
Enough examples of unfair trading 
practices and production subsidies 
exist around the world to give some 
credence to the common portrayal 
of U.S. farmers under siege from 
unfair competition. High Japanese 
import tariffs, large E.U. export 
subsidies, and seemingly endless 
E.U. production subsidies certainly 
exist and depress demand for U.S. 
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products. However, there are many 
examples of competing countries 
that provide very little support for 
their agricultural sectors, and some 
competitors are actually placed at 
a competitive disadvantage by their 
governments’ policies.
New Zealand and Chile are 
perhaps the two best examples of 
countries that have found agricul-
tural success without subsidies. 
Their consumers have easy access to 
imported food products so their pro-
ducers must compete with foreign 
producers for sales in their domestic 
markets, and export-oriented pro-
ducers must export at world prices. 
New Zealand farmers export dairy 
products, lamb, fruit, wine, and pro-
duce grains and vegetables for their 
domestic market. Chile is best known 
for exporting fruit and wine, but 
Chile is looking at export markets for 
pork, beef, and dairy products also. 
Brazil and Australia are two 
agricultural powerhouses that have 
thrived with minimal production sub-
sidies. According to the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment, government support ac-
counts for 3 percent of farm receipts 
in Brazil and for 4 percent in Austra-
lia. But farm groups often complain 
about the unfair competition from 
these two countries. For example, 
the American Sugar Alliance—the 
lobbying organization for the U.S. 
sugar industry—has complained 
about the $82 million in sugar subsi-
dies Australia provided in 2002.  But 
this amounts to less than 0.7¢ per 
pound of Australian sugar. Com-
plaints about Brazil range from infra-
structure investments, to currency 
devaluations, to subsidized credit. 
But infrastructure investments are 
a proper function of government, 
and Brazilian monetary policy is not 
determined by how it helps or hurts 
the agricultural sector. Credit subsi-
dies for purchasing machinery pro-
vide much less production stimulus 
than do U.S. loan rates.
Argentina provides a near-perfect 
example of a major agricultural com-
petitor that actually reduces the com-
petitiveness of its farmers through 
both offi cial and unoffi cial policy 
interventions. Besides the damage 
caused by Argentina’s macroeco-
nomic policies, offi cial Argentine 
agricultural policy levies a 20 percent 
tax on beef, dairy, soybean, and grain 
exports. The purpose of the tax is 
to raise revenue for the government 
and to help hold down food prices 
for Argentine consumers. The impact 
on agriculture is lower investment, 
productivity, production, exports, 
and farmer income. Unoffi cial policy 
in Argentina can be equally damag-
ing. Argentina is tied for 97th place 
on Transparency International’s 
global Corruption Perceptions Index 
(see http://www.transparency.org/               
policy_and_research/surveys_
indices/cpi/2005). This low ranking 
compares to 17th place for the Unit-
ed States, 21st place for Chile, and 
62nd place for Brazil. One example of 
Argentine corruption involves the re-
cent campaign to hold down infl ation 
by pressuring companies to reduce 
prices. Some food companies were 
told that their expansion plans were 
not going to be permitted unless they 
agreed to reduce their prices. In con-
trast to the positive attitude in Chile 
and Brazil about agriculture’s future, 
Argentine farmers and food com-
panies have a fatalistic view of the 
future. Despite enormous potential 
for productivity gains in Argentine 
agriculture, the attitude of the people 
who would have to do the hard work 
and investments to achieve the gains 
is that the government will never 
allow them to reap the profi ts from 
such endeavors.
Two Paths 
U.S. agriculture faces two possible 
future paths. One follows the direc-
tion laid out by the recent U.S. WTO 
proposal. This path would involve 
less direct government management 
of prices and production through 
guaranteed prices, a gradual ration-
alization of U.S. agriculture that 
would emphasize production of 
those products that U.S. farmers are 
relatively good at producing, and a 
gradual lowering of barriers to trade 
around the world. This path would 
require gradual investment adjust-
ment by processors, acreage adjust-
ment by farmers, and, depending 
on the willingness of Congress to 
support land prices, some fi nan-
cial adjustment by farmers in some 
regions. 
An alternative path is gaining 
momentum among some U.S. farm 
groups. This path would increase 
government control over the direc-
tion of U.S. agriculture. Export mar-
kets would not be seen as growth 
opportunities. Trade agreements 
would be de-emphasized or ig-
nored. Imports would be restricted. 
Prices would be set by a combina-
tion of paid land diversions, loan 
rates, and biofuels subsidies. At a 
recent Iowa Corn Growers Asso-
ciation crop fair, one corn grower, 
seemingly an advocate of this sec-
ond path, stated that expanded U.S. 
exports only damage the farmers 
in the importing countries, and im-
ports only damage U.S. producers; 
so why, he wondered, should we 
ever allow trade in food?
Given the current lack of sup-
port for trade liberalization in Con-
gress, and in key E.U. countries such 
as France, it is not clear that a new 
WTO agreement will be achieved. If 
not, U.S. farm programs will con-
tinue to be vulnerable to WTO cases 
under the current agreement. Advo-
cates of the second path for U.S. ag-
riculture could then fi nd themselves 
in a stronger position, arguing that 
the U.S. Congress should write farm 
policy, not the WTO. The large dif-
ference in direction represented 
by these two paths means that all 
of us with an interest in the future 
of U.S. agriculture should closely 
follow what happens in the next six 
months of WTO negotiations. ◆
